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Review
Genocide and the Europeans
Karen E. Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
290pp.

Kate Ferguson*
Next year the world will commemorate twenty years since the Rwandan genocide and the
following year will mark twenty years since the genocide at Srebrenica. As the
International Community prepares to honor these grim milestones, somber deliberation of
the mistakes of the past must inform the development of a more committed future. Karen
Smith’s book, Genocide and the Europeans, provides just such a reflection for Europe,
tracing the continent’s policy responses to incidents of genocide since the Holocaust. It is
an important text that draws a detailed history of the past sixty years, pairing the careful
analysis of an international relations “constructivism” framework with engrossing
gobbets that take the reader’s understanding beyond the structural political surface.
Despite its title, Genocide and the Europeans in fact focusses on the three
traditional European powers—Germany, France and Britain—rather than the continent as
a whole. And from a policy perspective, this makes sense. The “big three” continue to
determine the direction of the European Union and to represent Europe on the world
stage as they have since the 1860s. There is a significant degree of shared historical
experience, as well as collective contemporary interests between the countries that Smith
examines. All three had empires, the legacies of which form some of the case studies of

*

Kate Ferguson is a Ph.D. student at the University of East Anglia. Her dissertation research examines the
roles of paramilitary and irregular forces in ethnic conflicts, and has a particular focus on the wars in the
Yugoslav succession. As a consultant, she assists the policy and research work of the genocide prevention
organization Aegis Trust in the UK and Rwanda.

Genocide and the Europeans 249
the book. What separates them, of course, is the Second World War; Germany’s
extraordinary experience of the Holocaust left a duel legacy of “Never Again Auschwitz”
and “Never Again War” that has come to characterize the German post-war foreign
policy but is also now a strong societal norm. As victors, Britain and France were
involved in decisions that led to the Nuremberg Trials, the creation of the United Nations,
the drawing up of the Genocide Convention, and the establishment of the Human Rights
Charter. They are both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. As
Genocide and the Europeans makes clear, it was the long shadows of the Second World
War and of empire that informed the societal as well as strategic norms, which continue
to affect the national responses to genocide in Germany, France, and Britain.
In the first section of the book, Smith deals with the post-war aftermath skillfully
and succinctly. Her clear presentation of the interests and fears that informed the drafting
of the Genocide Convention is somewhat sobering. The protracted debate over which
principles could or should be set out in the Convention, and which determined its final
wording, was so much of its time. The British, for example, rejected Raphael Lemkin’s
notion of cultural genocide because they felt it too expansive, and left the UK vulnerable
to accusations of genocide in the British German zone, throughout the colonies, and
against the Welsh. As Smith explains, “[t]he initial draft of the Convention had
prohibited destroying the language, religion, and culture of a group.” France and the
Netherlands shared Britain’s concerns about cultural genocide and it was removed from
the Convention. Similarly, “political groups” were pointedly excluded, at the behest of
Belgium, USSR, and the U.S., though against the wishes of Britain and France. If these
provisions had been included, the prevailing understanding of genocide could be very
different today. Thus, the Genocide Convention is presented less as a missed opportunity
and more as an ill-prepared product of its time.
What Smith makes clear is the emptiness of the motives behind state accession
to the Genocide Convention, not just in Britain and France, but around the world.
Uniquely, Germany’s accession was driven more by genuine commitment to the
Convention’s mandate. And it is this chapter that provides the contextual setting for how
post-war and post-Cold War Europe dealt with the legacy of the Holocaust in its policy
responses to genocide.
Smith then takes the reader through a series of unhappy case studies that
illustrate the changes and continuity of mainstream European attitudes and policy
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responses to genocide. While her core studies are Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–95);
Rwanda (1994); Kosovo (1999); and Darfur (2003–4), Smith gives a strong analysis of
Cold War discourses, though this chapter does appear to be dominated by British
responses.
In tracking the narrative of Europe’s responses to each case, Smith reveals that
they were not consistent, laying bare the prejudices of the time, and hinting at the
influence of socio-cultural pressures on parliamentary debate. It is interesting, for
example, to compare Smith’s analysis of Germany’s reaction to the images of
concentration camps in Bosnia in summer 1992, and the vicious images pouring out of
Rwanda throughout the hundred days in 1994; the pictures of emaciated men behind
barbed wire (described in the British press as Belsen ’92) stimulated genuine German
responsibilities within the parts of the political establishment and caused such social
distress that the government asserted a stronger position. In Rwanda, Germans saw no
such parallel.1 A limitation, however, of keeping the case studies separate is that it is
unclear how the Bosnian and Rwandan debates overlapped in European parliaments and
public discussion, if at all.
From Bosnia onwards, the increasing tendency to emphasize the humanitarian
dimension of crises has led to a new norm that continues to grow stronger, whereby
European governments are compelled to assist with the intent to mitigate genocidal crises
but not to intervene, the notable exception being Kosovo. While providing humanitarian
aid should not and cannot be a substitute for an integrated genocide prevention policy, in
the post-Iraq-world where intervention is a dirty concept, this norm of international
responsibility should be celebrated, especially in the context set by Smith’s first chapter
of post-war attitudes. Smith’s chronology, therefore, demonstrates the large strides that
have been made in this regard since the Second World War settlements. The
responsibility to protect may yet to be internalized by the majority, but the obligation to
care has become entrenched in mainstream European politics and in parts of European
society.
As with any analysis of how politicians deal with the issue of genocide,
language is a key theme of this book. Smith shows how the language of humanitarian
tragedy comes to dominate the public political statements but it is less clear why this shift
takes place. Pubic pressure on European governments is discussed but the dramatic
changes that took place in the 1990s in war reporting and technology are not. The impact
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of 24-hour news on public policymakers was immense, particularly over Bosnia, Rwanda
and Kosovo, but less so with Darfur. As publics in the West have become accustomed to
images of slaughter (as since Darfur they have become accustomed to the word
‘genocide’) it would be interesting to consider whether pressures to act have increased or
subsided.
Smith scrutinizes the use of the very word ‘genocide’ by each government in
relation to each case. The particularly British hostility towards the language of genocide,
where the word was initially described in the House of Commons in October 1949 as
“horrible” and “horribly illiterate,” persists throughout the cases examined in this
volume.2 Contrasting the reluctance in much of Europe to use the term in relation to
Bosnia or Rwanda with the blunt acknowledgement that what was going on in Darfur in
2003–4 was genocide, Smith demonstrates a certain redundancy of the definition. The
academic disagreements over whether Darfur was or was not genocide mattered in the
sense that scholars of the Sudan crisis were engaging with policymakers, but not in the
sense that governments became any more willing to act once they accepted that genocide
was the mot juste.
Smith’s conclusion to her useful and engrossing study is unsurprisingly gloomy.
Genocide and the Europeans confirms that underneath the often tawdry postulating over
language in European parliaments, national interests determine national responses to
genocides. Poor history, common prejudices and clumsy cultural assumptions have
provided foils for governments’ policies of non-action throughout the post-Cold War era,
but as Smith shows, it is the political and economic stakes that matter. Inevitably too, the
role played by America has come to influence Europe’s politics. Although Smith does not
deal with this dynamic explicitly, the policies and principles of the United States are
woven in to the narrative demonstrating how the Iraq invasion in 2003 has had a
detrimental effect on the European agenda.
There are noticeable and encouraging forward steps in the European narrative
that Smith teases out of obscurity. One such step is the long-term impact the genocide at
Srebrenica had on the pacifism of Germany’s Green Party, which led to important
internal debates about humanitarian intervention. The catastrophic failures over Bosnia
and Rwanda improved the culture of self-analysis in Europe; the Dutch, Belgians, and
French all carried out investigations into their own national responses and
responsibilities. Despite the initial reluctance within the International Criminal Tribunal

252 Kate Ferguson
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to convict on genocide charges, the tribunal for
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set significant
precedents that paved the way for the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the time of
the book’s publication, Mladić had not yet been caught, a fact that Smith recognized as
an indicator of European commitment to the justice process in the Balkans, though I
believe it will be the outcome of Karadžić’s trial rather than that of Mladić that will
determine the tribunal’s success. The activism sparked by the Darfur crisis may not have
secured wholesale military intervention but it stimulated what Smith calls the “genocide
movement,” which in the wake of Darfur has diversified into a broad genocide prevention
sector, across academic institutions and civil society groups.
Smith concludes that there are two possible reasons for the perpetual reluctance
among the three European powers to use the word ‘genocide’. First, she suggests that the
potential for debasing the unique horror of the Holocaust pertains particularly to the
European post-war consensus. However, of the three states it is Germany that Smith
repeatedly cites as the more willing to use the terminology and draw comparisons with
the Shoah. Smith’s second and perhaps more pertinent conclusion, at least from the
perspective of the future of European policy, is that the European powers have continued
to treat genocide—the term and the act—as a crime rather than “just” a gross violation of
human rights and, therefore, placed the onus on first proving its existence and then
punishing those responsible. Smith argues that following the Cold War, France and
Britain focused on developing the legal norms, rather than the norms “against genocide”
that required intervention. Today, Europe is the global champion of the International
Criminal Court but the creation of the ICTY and ICTR developed in the face of much
European criticism. Europe has emerged as the region most explicitly committed to the
Rome Statute. And one cannot help noting that the EU has diluted the traditional
sovereignty of its member states while the European powers have embraced the ICC’s
jurisdiction far beyond any other region in the world.
Smith has contributed an invaluable addition to our understanding of how the
European powers have responded to genocide since the Holocaust. Reading this book,
one is struck simultaneously by how far Europe has come in shouldering those
responsibilities towards peoples under grave threat, and by the persistent triumph of
cynical political and financial interests over the lives of strangers.
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There are few such examinations of European responses to genocide that focus
on the policy and rhetoric rather than societal reactions, and thus the book raises a great
number of questions to be pondered and answered. Genocide and the Europeans should
be considered essential reading not only for students of the subject but for all who work
within the prevention sector and, most of all, the policymakers upon whose shoulders
such immense responsibilities inevitably lie.

NOTES
1. This was in stark contrast to the Czech Ambassador to the UN, Karel Kovanda, who in
1994 drew direct comparisons of what was happening in Rwanda to his own country’s
experience of the Holocaust.
2. It should be noted that recent foreign policy rhetoric of the current administration has
demonstrated a willingness to use the term and to draw comparisons between the
Syrian crisis and the Holocaust. See Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Holocaust
Educational Trust, David Cameron, 16 September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/25th-anniversary-of-the-holocaust-educational-trust-primeministers-speech

